Tuesday, November 3, 2015

Volunteer's Dilemma

Volunteer's Dilemma

It is recommended you read the blog post on the Prisoner's Dilemma before continuing.

You find yourself as a night guard to an ancient Roman village. Stationed at your inconspicuous post just outside the village boarder, you notice the Gauls (Rome's enemies back in the day) stealthily approach, armed to the teeth with weapons. Their intent is easy to guess: kill all Roman guardsmen and sack the village. Still, you and all of your fellow guards are stationed in hard-to-see spots. If you remain silent, the Gauls will walk right by you into the village. Sound the alarm to alert the townspeople and other guards, however, and they will descend upon your position like ants to spilled food. Here lies the dilemma. Each guard, you included, has to either make a sacrifice such that all others will benefit, or to do nothing.


At least one other guard sounds the alarm All other guards stay quiet
Sound the Alarm Village safe, one guard dies, might be you Village safe, you die
Stay quiet Village safe, you live All villagers die

Luckily for everyone, you and the rest of the guard have enough honor to believe that the safety of your village has greater value than each single guard's life. Still, you want to avoid the chance of sacrificing your life when another guard would have sounded the alarm for you. You can't know what the other guards are going to do, so you have to make the critical decision alone. If you guess another guard will sacrifice himself, the best option is to stay quiet. If you guess other guards will stay quiet, the best option is to sound the alarm. As such, there is no dominate strategy.
Very interesting to note is that, in general, people will guess that someone else will make the sacrifice the more other people there are. That is, if you are defending a village with 1000 soldiers, surely, you guess, one of them is going to make the sacrifice. Similarly, a defense of only you and one other guard might leave you hesitant to believe that the one other guard will make the sacrifice. Naturally, if it's just you, you can be sure that no one else has done anything. The kicker is that the strength of the guess about whether someone else has made the sacrifice is directly related to how many other people there are, and that your decision to stay silent is based on the strength of that guess. As a result, the more people in the scenario, the less likely any one person is going to make the sacrifice, giving this dilemma a paradoxical quality.

Here's the abstract payoff matrix for the Volunteer's Dilemma, using numbers to represent utility.
Others sacrifice Others defect
You sacrifice You: 9, Others: 9 You: 9, Others: 10
You defect You: 10, Others: 9 You: 0, Others: 0

There are two equilibria in the dilemma: the top right and bottom left positions. If the guess that someone else has made the sacrifice is strong enough, all parties are pushed towards defection, resulting in what is clearly the worst outcome.

Truly a noble man making a noble sacrifice.


The phenomenon where people are less likely to act when in the presence of others is strongly related to the bystander effect and the diffusion of responsibility. While it would be nice to change our nature, to realize that our own sacrifice is so trivial as to warrant being ignored in situations where the greater good is sizable, the truth is that this does not always happen. Our sacrifices are likely felt so personally as to be impossible to ignore, making the Volunteer's Dilemma and bystander effect a very real, and sometimes very tragic, event.

Sources and Further Reading:
Volunteer's Dilemma on Wikipedia
Bystander Effect on Wikipedia
Case study on the Volunteer's Dilemma

5 comments:

  1. Great post Bayard! Since there are two equilibria is there a nash equilibrium for this problem?

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Both equilibria are Nash equilibria. That is, the Volunteer's Dilemma has two situations such that each agent cannot benefit by changing their choice while the other agent keeps their choice constant.

      Delete
  2. Hmm, I guess the bottom line is that people suck! So, in the version of this game that you analyzed, are you allowing mixed strategies? That is, do people have to (deterministically) pick whether to make the small sacrifice or free-ride, or can they have some probability p of sacrificing and probability 1-p of free-riding? If you allow mixed strategies, how does this change the game?

    Of potential interest (especially for, say, a final paper on this topic), here's an interesting Cal Tech article about how this dilemma is handled in real life (http://people.virginia.edu/~cah2k/vg_paper.pdf)---in this work, the researchers actually did some lab experiments to see how people deviated from the rational equilibria.

    ReplyDelete
  3. I think the volunteers dilemma is one of the most relatable subjects that many people can relate to. The bystanders effect is a thing that influences people all across the world and their decision making. Its crazy how all of the pieces come together for things like this but when you add them all up, there is no question as to what to do/ what makes sense. thinking about a payoff that isnt at everyones best interest doesnt seem like it would even be an option, but the way we all think about problems and relying on other people seems to always dominate ones influence. Great post Bayard!

    ReplyDelete
  4. Bayard, I'm really glad I got to learn more about the volunteer's dilemma. I realized there were a few instances in my research paper on evolutionary game theory where I confused the volunteer's dilemma with the prisoners' dilemma. For example, vervet monkeys act in a way consistent with the volunteer's dilemma. If a predator approaches, the first monkey to see the predator will shriek loudly warning the other members of his tribe. In doing so, he reveals his own position. This altruism continues because the monkey who volunteers expects the other monkeys in the tribe to return the favor in the future. In my paper I had cited this as an example of an iterated prisoners' dilemma, when it much more closely resembles the volunteer's dilemma.

    ReplyDelete